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URING the time period covered by this article, the Texas Legisla-
ture was not in session, therefore no legislative changes of any type
occurred. The most recent legislative changes were the significant
revisions to the Property Code enacted by the 71st Texas Legislature.' The
prior survey article on construction law described these changes. 2 Since the
new laws did not go into effect until September 1, 1989, no cases reached the
appellate courts under the new legislative revisions during the prior survey
period.
No exceptionally significant appellate court decisions appeared during this
review period. The Texas Supreme Court attempted to clarify its express
negligence rule in no less than two cases,3 and explored the theory of quan-
tum meruit in three cases.4 This article canvasses these cases and other re-
cent developments in the broad area of law encompassed by the construction
industry.
I. EXPRESS NEGLIGENCE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS
The Texas Supreme Court first dealt with the express negligence rule dur-
ing the survey period in Enserch Corp. v. Parker.5 That case involved a
wrongful death action brought by the estate of two construction workers
employed by contractor A. W. "Bill" Christie, Inc. (Christie), and killed
while servicing a pipeline for Enserch Corporation (Enserch). Christie had
entered into a contract with Enserch that contained an indemnity agree-
ment.6 Enserch argued that the indemnity agreement contained an express
* B.A. University of Texas; J.D. University of Texas; Law Offices of C. Bennett, Jr.,
Dallas, Texas.
1. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1138, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4693.
2. Thomas & Wilshusen, Construction Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 467, 480-87 (1990).
3. See infra notes 16-27 and accompanying text (discussing Payne & Keller, Inc. v.
P.P.G. Indus., Inc.); infra notes 5-15 and accompanying text (discussing Enserch Corp. v.
Parker).
4. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text (discussing Emerson v. Tunnell); infra
notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc.); infra note 56 (discussing Dobbins v. Redden).
5. 794 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1990).
6. The language examined by the court and contained in the contract was as follows:
(Christie] assumes entire responsibility and liability for any claim or actions
based on or arising out of injuries, including death, to persons or damages to or
destruction of property, sustained or alleged to have been §ustained in connec-
tion with or to have arisen out of or incidental to the performance of this con-
tract by [Christie], its agents and employees, and its subcontractors, their agents
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assumption of liability by the contractor.
The Texas Supreme Court found that the language was sufficient under
the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's bar to indemnity provisions.7 The
Texas Supreme Court had no difficulty holding that although the language
did not specifically refer to employees of the subcontractor, the language in
the indemnity agreement, which included persons, sufficiently covered
employees.8
The court then dealt with whether the language complied with the express
negligence rule formulated in Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Construction Co. 9 This
rule states that a party seeking indemnity from the consequences of its own
negligence must express that intent in specific terms within the four corners
of the contract.10 Since the Texas Supreme Court set out this rule in broad
language, rather than specifically dictating what the indemnificatory lan-
guage should be, the plaintiffs made the somewhat typical argument that the
language in the contract was not clear enough to comply with the rule."
The Texas Supreme Court held that although the contract separated the in-
demnity agreement and negligence clauses into separate sentences, the lan-
guage sufficiently demonstrated the parties' intent to hold Enserch harmless
and, therefore, complied with the express negligence rule.' 2 The plaintiff
also argued that the indemnity language was not conspicuous.' 3 The court
held, however, that the language, appearing on the front page and not hid-
den on the back page among a number of other articles, was sufficiently
conspicuous to be enforced.14 Therefore, the court upheld the indemnity
agreement. '5
In Payne & Keller, Inc. v. P.P.G. Industries, Inc. 16 the Texas Supreme
Court dealt with a somewhat less harsh indemnity provision. The clause
contained an exception to indemnity if the sole negligence of the indemnitee
and employees, regardless of whether such claims or actions are founded in whole
or in part upon alleged negligence of [Enserch, [Enserch 's] representative, or the
employees, agents, invitee, or licensees thereof. (Christie] further agrees to in-
demnify and hold harmless [Enserch] and its representatives, and the employees,
agents, invitees and licensees thereof in respect of any such matters and agrees to
defend any claim or suit or action brought against [Enserch], [Enserch's] repre-
sentative, and employees, agents, invitees, and licensees thereof ....
Id. at 6-7 (emphasis in original).
7. These provisions provide that a subscribing employer has no liability to reimburse
another person for injury or death to an employee unless specifically set forth in writing. TEx.
REv. Civ. STAT. art. 8308-4.01 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
8. 794 S.W.2d at 7.
9. 725 S.W.2d 705 (rex. 1987).
10. Id. at 708.
11. Specifically, one of the plaintiffs argued that "because the actual reference to negli-
gence is made in a separate sentence from the reference to indemnification, the clause conceals
Enserch's true intent to be indemnified for its own negligence." 794 S.W.2d at 8.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 9; see also K & S Oil Well Serv., Inc. v. Cabot Corp., 491 S.W.2d 733, 737-38
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. 794 S.W.2d at 9.
16. 793 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. 1990).
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caused the injury.1 7 In the trial court, the jury found that the indemnitee's
(P.P.G.'s) negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the injury.18 One
may wonder why P.P.G. would even make an argument defending itself
against liability in the face of such a jury finding.
The court of appeals, however, found in P.P.G.'s favor, 19 relying on the
case of Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Railway
Co. 20 The Texas Supreme Court distinguished Lone Star because the indem-
nity clause in that case specifically stated that the sole negligence exception
did not apply in any claim arising under the Federal Employers Liability
Act (FELA).21 In Payne & Keller the clause simply relieved Payne & Keller
from indemnification upon a finding that P.P.G. was solely negligent.22 An-
other reason for P.P.G.'s position was that the Texas Supreme Court, in
Singleton v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.,23 held that remarkably similar
language did not comply with the court's express negligence rule.24 None-
theless, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals in Payne & Keller
and enforced the sole negligence exception in that case.
The Payne & Keller appellate court also considered another indemnifica-
tion case in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Texas, Inc. 25 In that
case, the court upheld an indemnity agreement when the jury found both the
indemnitor and indemnitee concurrently negligent. 26 Thus, the holdings in
Payne & Keller and Gulf Oil seem to indicate that the courts strengthened
the enforceability of indemnity provisions in the two years following the
Ethyl decision.27
The case of Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp. v. Universal Health Services,
Inc. ,28 though not involving construction, is instructive in construing and
enforcing indemnity provisions. That case involved an indemnity given by
17. Payne & Keller indemnified P.P.G. for claims "'arising out of... the acts or omis-
sions... of [Payne & Keller] or its ... employees... in the performance of the work...
irrespective of whether [P.P.G.] was concurrently negligent ... but excepting where the injury
or death... was caused by the sole negligence of [P.P.G.].' Id. at 957.
18. Id. at 958.
19. P.P.G. Indus., Inc. v. Payne & Keller, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1989), rev'd, 793 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. 1990).
20. 666 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. 956 S.W.2d at 958; see 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988) (Federal Employer's Liability Act).
22. 956 S.W.2d at 959. Furthermore, the FELA provision contains a different burden of
proof than the common law negligence standard applicable in Payne & Keller.
23. 729 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1987).
24. The appellate court opinion contains the contractual language in Singleton v. Crown
Central Petroleum Corp. It reads as follows:
Contractor agrees to... indemnify... Owner... from and against.. . all
claims, demands, actions... and expenses ... for or in connection with...
personal injury... arising out of... the activities of Contractor... or in
connection with the work to be performed. . . under this contract, excepting
only claims arising out of accidents resulting from the sole negligence of owner.
Singleton v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. 713 S.W.2d 115, 117-18 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1985), rev'd, 729 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1987).
25. 782 S.W.2d 28, 29-30 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
26. Id. at 30.
27. For cases denying indemnity, see Monsanto Co. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
764 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); Singleton, 729 S.W.2d at 691.
28. 778 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
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an aircraft lessee to the lessor. The indemnity contained exceptions for la-
tent defects and also excluded loss damages, injuries or claims resulting from
the sole negligence of the lessor. Even though the indemnity language was
more complex and the fact questions much harder than a typical construc-
tion law case,29 the court, after an extensive analysis of the case in light of
the Ethyl v. Daniel rule, enforced the indemnity agreement. 30
A case during the past year in which an indemnitee attempted unsuccess-
fully to enforce an indemnity provision occurred in the Beaumont federal
district court in Exxon Corp. v. Enstar Engineering Co. 31 The court ex-
amined an unusual indemnity provision surrounded by difficult facts. In the
agreement, the owner and his contractor indemnified each other from inju-
ries caused by the negligent or willful misconduct of the indemnitor. With
regard to joint negligence, the indemnification provision allocated liability
based on the party's percentage of negligence. 32
The case involved a workers' compensation claim in which the injured
employee did not sue the contractor, its employer, but sued the owner di-
rectly. The owner settled with the injured employee and, therefore, there
was no court finding to indicate which party was negligent in the matter. In
addition, the suit for indemnity came after the limitations on the personal
injury action accrued, so the court could not make a finding as to the con-
tractor's negligence. The court, even without such findings, held that the
language did not clearly indemnify one party for its own negligence and
thus, would fail under Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Construction Co. 33 Thus, the
parties' attempts at allocating negligence rather than indemnifying against it
defeated the validity of the indemnity agreement.
I. CONTRACTS
A. Construction of a Contract/Intention of Parties for Home
Improvements
In First Victoria National Bank v. Briones34 the court dealt with the con-
struction of several documents making up a mechanic's and materialman's
lien contract for home improvement, and resolved a dispute between the
homeowner, the general contractor and the lender.35 The mechanic's lien
29. The case involved the crash of a helicopter in which all aboard died and in which the
helicopter was totally consumed in the wreckage.
30. Id. at 501.
31. 732 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Tex. 1990); see also City of Houston v. Goings, 795 S.W.2d
829 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (owner sought immunity when no
clause providing for such indemnity appeared in its contract).
32. The indemnification provision stated that "[w]here personal injury, death or loss of or
damage to property is the result of joint negligence or willful misconduct of Exxon and Con-
tractor, the indemnitor's duty of indemnification shall be in proportion to its allocable share of
such joint negligence or willful misconduct." 732 F. Supp. at 719.
33. Id. at 20.
34. 788 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
35. Typical home improvements accomplished on borrowed money in Texas afford ripe
situations for contract disputes to arise because of multiple parties to the transaction, the dif-
ferent type laws that apply to the transaction, and the number of technical documents re-
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contract totaled $20,000 for home improvement to the home of Mr. and
Mrs. Charles Waters, Jr. It appeared from parol evidence, however, that the
Waters used at least $4,244.02 of the initial advance to pay delinquent taxes
on the property and closing costs, pursuant to oral agreements. The con-
tractor, Briones, received only $14,000 of the original contract price and,
after completion of the improvements, sued the owner and the bank for the
$6,000 difference. The trial court instructed a verdict favorable to the gen-
eral contractor and against the bank.36
In addition, the evidence revealed that the contractor and the owner
signed an affidavit as to debts and liens in connection with the closing of the
permanent loan. In the affidavit, both swore that they had fully paid and
satisfied all sums of money due for the erection of the improvements. Fur-
thermore, both indemnified the bank for any subsequent claims or liens.
Although the trial court instructed a verdict for the contractor, the court of
quired. The typical home improvement loan involves an owner contracting with a general
contractor for improvements to his homestead, with the improvements to be financed by a
third party lender. For a detailed discussion of this and related transactions, see STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, LEGAL FORM MANUAL FOR REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, ch. 500 (1986). The
law governing the transaction because of its homestead nature is found in TEX. CONsT. art.
XVI, § 50 (1869). The technical requirements of a mechanic's lien on a homestead are found
in the Texas Property Code. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.059 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1991).
Other provisions of Texas and federal law apply when the transaction is financed by a lender.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67(e) (1988) (disclosure and consumer protection laws); 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-17 (1988) (Federal Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1988)
(federal usury laws); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5609-1.02-.12 (Vernon 1987) (Texas
Consumer Credit Act); 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1989) (Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board).
In the typical home improvement transaction secured by a mechanic's lien, the contractor and
owner sign a mechanic's lien contract prior to the commencement of construction. The parties
file the lien with the county clerk in the county where the property resides. The owner then
executes a mechanic's lien note, payable to the contractor, for the contract amount of con-
struction. The contractor then endorses the note and gives it to a third party lender, along
with an assignment and transfer of the mechanic's lien, and sometimes a renewal note. The
lender files a deed of trust contained in the original contract or another document on the
property to secure payment of the note. Generally, there is a tri-party agreement between and
among the lender, the general contractor and the owner, providing for progress payments to
the general contractor from the lender for labor performed and materials furnished during the
progress of the job. The construction commences and continues to completion with the con-
tractor being paid by progress payments and a final payment of retention following completion
of the job. After completion, the owner, either under the original deed of trust or under re-
newal document, begins to make payments on the note to the lender, and the contractor steps
out of the transaction. Because of the complexity of the transaction, if a job does not go
according to the intentions and plans of the parties, any number of factual situations can cause
disputes between and among the parties to the transaction. For example, if the contractor is
not paid, the issue might arise as to who actually holds the mechanic's lien, the contractor or
the lender. The inevitable extras or change orders to the job raise the issue of whether or not
the lender is required to finance them. Lien and real estate issues apply as between the owner
and lender after the job is complete, as well as priority of liens. Thus, it is surprising that there
are not more lawsuits arising from such transactions. The only clear way to aid in the avoid-
ance of unnecessary conflicts seems to be a tri-party agreement between and among the lender,
the owner and the contractor regarding everyone's rights, duties and obligations between and
among themselves. Otherwise, the courts must necessarily resort to parol evidence. See First
Nat'l Bank of Amarillo v. Janigan, 794 S.W.2d 54 (rex. App.-Amarillo 1990, writ denied);
First Victoria Nat'l Bank v. Briones, 788 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ
denied).
36. 788 S.W.2d at 634. The contractor and the owner apparently settled their differences
prior to trial. Id.
1991]
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appeals reversed and rendered judgment, stating that the general contractor
take nothing against the bank.37 In formulating its opinion, the court relied
upon excluded parol evidence regarding the intention of the parties for utili-
zation of the initial advance and the payment of taxes and closing costs. 38
The court did not deal with the fact that, even taking the payment for taxes
and closing costs into account, the numbers still did not balance, leaving
unaccounted a total of $1,755.98. Instead, the court seemed to base its opin-
ion on the affidavit of completion executed by the general contractor and the
owner. This case is instructive to owners, general contractors, lenders and
title companies in home improvement situations to document carefully the
disbursements of all monies and not to rely upon customary or industry-
wide practices of leaving certain aspects of the parties' intentions with re-
spect to money application unexplained.
B Oral Changes and Modifications of Contracts/Ratification by Actions
In Preferred Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Shelby39 a construction
subcontractor and supplier contracted with the general contractor for the
placement of large heating and air conditioning units. While the general
contractor received initial progress payments, the subcontractor collected no
payments at all. Therefore, the subcontractor refused to install the equip-
ment. According to oral testimony, an owner's representative promised to
pay the subcontractor for the equipment directly if the subcontractor would
install it.40 The Texas Supreme Court held that evidence supported a jury
award to the subcontractor on an oral contract theory and remanded the
case to the court of appeals for further consideration. 4' The finding in this
case suggests that practitioners utilize the theory of a new and independent
oral contract for completion if their client deals with a contracting party
who defaults for some reason and the next responsible party desires the ma-
terial supplier or subcontractor to complete what the defaulting party al-
ready started. 42
Although a non-construction case, Robbins v. Warren 43 presents an inter-
esting interpretation of the parol evidence rule. The first district of the
37. Id. at 636.
38. Id. at 635.
39. 778 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. 1989).
40. A somewhat more common instance in which this type of situation occurs is one in
which a general contractor becomes insolvent and goes out of business, whereupon the owner
literally guarantees payment if a supplier or subcontractor will perform. The question then
arises whether such a guarantee is in violation of the Statute of Frauds, thereby prohibiting the
supplier or subcontractor from recovering because of lack of a signed guaranty agreement.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The court failed to men-
tion the guaranty aspect of the dispute in Preferred.
41. 778 S.W.2d at 68.
42. See Circle Double "C" Enter. v. Wisco Elec., Inc., 782 S.W.2d 299, 301-02 (rex.
App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ) (analogous case in which appellate court held written agree-
ment for completion valid in face of general contractor's argument that agreement was void as
assignment of contract).
43. 782 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ) (involving dispute
between buyer and seller of stock in which appellate court reversed summary judgment in
favor of seller based solely on written contract).
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Houston court of appeals held not only that the parol evidence rule does not
apply to agreements made after a written agreement, but also that the rule
does not prevent the written agreement from being later modified by the
parties by oral agreement. 4 Furthermore, the court found that a written
contract not required by law to be in writing may be modified by subsequent
oral agreement even though it provides that it cannot be modified except by
written agreement. 45
The fourteenth district of the Houston court of appeals, in the case of
Zieben v. Platt,"6 dealt with the theory of contract ratification and estoppel
by contract in a case analogous to those arising in a construction setting. In
the Zieben case a purchaser of real estate bought certain properties on a note
and deed of trust. The purchaser was a developer who intended to build
apartment units on one of the tracts of property after the area sewage plant
had been expanded. The promissory note matured in 1982, and the parties
extended it for two more years. When the note became due in 1984, the
sewage treatment plant still had not been expanded. The purchaser at-
tempted to obtain another extension on the note, but the seller refused. The
purchaser then attempted to rescind the contract and his obligations under
the note because the property did not have the necessary utility capacity.
The court dealt with whether the purchaser specifically assumed the risk of
the plant's expansion in the initial contract before renewal.47 The court
stated, however, that this fact was immaterial because the purchaser ratified
the contract when he obtained his first renewal.48 The court stated that rati-
fication occurs when a party performs some act under the contract or affirm-
atively acknowledges its validity; that ratification may either be express or
implied from a course of conduct; and that a party can utilize the estoppel by
contract theory in order to prevent an opponent from taking a position in-
consistent with its contractual provisions to the prejudice of the other con-
tracting party.49
The parties in Zieben signed an initial contract which they not only acted,
but also extended the original time limitations. The issue for the construc-
tion industry would be whether the ratification and estoppel by contract the-
ories apply in cases in which the parties performed the provisions of a
construction contract prior to the executing a written contract. Presumably,
ratification could apply whether or not the party established a written con-
tract, although estoppel would seem to apply only in a situation where the
parties formulated an oral or written contract.
44. Id. at 512.
45. Id.; see also Ambassador Dev. Corp. v. Valdez, 791 S.W.2d 612, 619-20 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1990, no writ) (opponent waived error by failing to object to evidence of oral
modification for allowance of extras).
46. 786 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
47. Id. at 801-02.





This year's review, as usual, includes several cases dealing with the subject
of substantial performance, a Texas rule concerning the measure of damages
in a building contract dispute. Theoretically, this rule applies when a con-
tractor sues for payment, although he has not completed his contract. The
Texas Commission of Appeals first enunciated this doctrine in 1925 in the
case of Atkinson v. Jackson Bros 50 and the Texas Supreme Court most re-
cently discussed its elements in Vance v. My Apartment Steak House of San
Antonio, Inc.51 Since the contractor had not completed his contract and
thus could not sue for performance, the contractor utilized the substantial
performance rule. Under the rule, the contractor has the burden and must
prove the following three elements: (1) that it did substantially perform; (2)
the amount of consideration that is due under the contract; and (3) the cost
of remedying defects due to its errors or omissions.52
In Ambassador Development Corp. v. Valdez53 an excavation subcontrac-
tor plead substantial performance against the owner who claimed that the
subcontractor's work was incomplete. There is no indication in the opinion
as to why the contractor did not plead full performance. The case appar-
ently went to the jury solely under a substantial performance theory; and the
jury found "none" when asked the cost of remedying the defects due to non-
completion or to contractors errors and omissions.54 The owner argued that
this finding, on the third element of proof under substantial performance,
fatally conflicted with an award under the substantial performance theory.55
The court of appeals considered the issue as one of first impression, that
being whether a party seeking recovery on a substantial performance theory
must secure a jury finding of more than "none" regarding costs of remedying
or correcting alleged defects or omissions in that party's work. The Fort
Worth court of appeals held that a finding of "none" regarding costs of com-
pletion and correction does not preclude a claimant from recovering under a
theory of substantial performance and, in fact, does not create a fatal conflict
between a jury's finding of substantial performance and its findings of zero
cost of completion and correctionA6
In another case involving, as a minor issue, substantial performance of a
contract between a contractor and an owner, a jury returned a verdict that
the contractor substantially performed under the contract, finding the cost of
completion to be $289,000 on a $4 million contract.57 The jury further
50. 270 S.W. 848 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, opinion adopted).
51. 677 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1984).
52. Id. at 482-83.
53. 791 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
54. Id. at 615.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 617; see also Dobbins v. Redden, 785 S.W.2d 377 (Iex. 1990) (providing more
typical fact situation in which breaching contractor failed to recover under contract because
did not prove that substantially performed; court found contractor should have plead quantum
meru it).
57. Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 781 S.W.2d 618, 628 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1989), rev'd on other grounds, 802 S.W.2d 226, 231 (Tex. 1990).
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found that although the contractor did not fully perform the contract, he did
not breach the contract.58 Although the owner/appellee argued that a find-
ing that the contractor did not fully perform was in conflict with a finding
that the contractor did not breach the contract, the court of appeals appar-
ently found no irreconcilable conflict between the jury verdict and the Vance
holding.59 Thus, from a reading of the appellate cases in this review period
on substantial performance, it appears that the courts will not overturn jury
findings that technically do not comply with the equitable rules of substan-
tial performance as set out in Vance and Atkinson.6°
Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc. 61 is an instructive case regarding the origi-
nal concepts of substantial performance and the type of pleading and proof
required if the theory were unavailable. In Garcia the appellate court re-
fused to allow a contractor who had breached a contract by failing to com-
plete the project on time to recover under a contract theory of substantial
completion, yet permitted the contractor to recover on an alternative theory
of quantum meruit.62 Quantum meruit allows the contractor the reasonable
value of his services, on the basis that the owner should not be unjustly en-
riched by retaining benefits without compensation.63
D. Conditions Precedent
Only one court of appeals discussed contingent payment clauses during
the review period, a subject with which the Texas Supreme Court has not
dealt. In Sheldon L. Pollack Corp. v. Falcon Industries, Inc. 64 the Corpus
Christi court of appeals dealt with a contingent payment schedule clause
between a contractor and subcontractor. 65 The court then quoted its posi-
tion in Gulf Construction Co. v. Self 66 in holding that the language, like that
58. Id.
59. Vance v. My Apartment Steak House of San Antonio, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 480, 482 (rex.
1984). The Vance holding, however, specifically states that "['bly definition, this doctrine rec-
ognizes that the contractor has not totally fulfilled his bargain under the contract-he is in
breach." Id. Perhaps one justification for the Mancorp ruling is that, as the court points out,
the appellee failed to cite any support for their theory. 781 S.W.2d at 628.
60. For an example of holdings and instructions pertinent to both a theory of full per-
formance and a theory of substantial performance, see Uhlir v. Golden Triangle Dev. Corp.,
763 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
61. 789 S.W.2d 656 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
62. Id. at 660-61.
63. Id. at 661; cf Dobbins v. Redden, 785 S.W.2d 377, 378 (Tex. 1990) (court refused to
grant compensation to contractor who failed to alternatively plead quantum meruit theory).
64. 794 S.W.2d 380 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
65. Specifically, the clause read as follows:
2. Payment Schedule: Contractor will pay subcontractor the sum of
$2,352,000.00 in installments as follows: lump sum of TWO MILLION
THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOL-
LARS ($2,352,000.00) ninety percent on or about the 30th day of each
month for work incorporated or materials suitably stored as acceptable to
owner and contractor and for which payment has been made by owner or
lender to contractor, ten percent to be paid following completion of the sub-
contractor's work and acceptance by owner and release to contractor of
retainage.
Id. at 383.
66. 676 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.---Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1991]
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in Gulf Construction, did not transfer the risk of non-payment to a subcon-
tractor because of the owner's insolvency.67 The court went on to hold that,
in general, the owner's insolvency does not defeat a subcontractor's claim
against the general contractor in a dispute focusing on the subcontractor and
general contractor's agreement. 68 In order to shift the risk of insolvency, the
court suggested that the contractor's contract with the subcontractor should
explicitly state the parties' intention to alter the normal chain of liability.69
Presumably, some courts would hold language as forming a condition prece-
dent, such as that in North Harris County Junior College District v. Fleetwood
Construction Co.,70 wherein the court upheld a condition precedent to the
payment of the subcontractor.71
In 1990, the Texas Supreme Court considered the condition precedent
theory in one unusual construction-related case, Criswell v. European Cross-
roads Shopping Center.72 In Criswell the supreme court considered a case in
which a professional engineer prepared plans to convert a shopping center
into condominium units in exchange for a percent of the proceeds from the
sale of the center on a condominium basis or, at the time of closing, as a
whole project. The owner argued that since he did not sell the project on a
condominium basis, the engineer was not entitled to payment because the
condition of a sale as condominium units was a condition precedent to pay-
ment. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, finding in part that to make
performance of a contract conditional, the contract language must normally
contain contingent terms such as if, provided that, on condition that, or
some other similar phrase of conditional language.73 The court does not
favor conditions precedent for several reasons including their harshness and
the policy to avoid forfeiture when another reasonable reading is possible or
when the intent of the parties is doubtful. The Texas judiciary thus prefers
to interpret the agreement as creating covenants rather than conditions. 74
E. Duty to Read
In Nautical Landings Marina, Inc. v. First National Bank in Port Lavaca 75
the court once again recited the fundamental principal that, absent fraud,
the law imposes an obligation upon individuals who sign documents to read
and comprehend the provisions contained in the agreement as a protection
67. Id. at 629-30.
68. 794 S.W.2d at 384.
69. Id.
70. 604 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
71. Id. at 255. In North Harris the court recognized that they may only ignore the condi-
tion precedent clause, requiring full payment to the contractor before payment to the subcon-
tractor, if the parties clearly intended this result. Id. In this case, however, the court found no
such intent. Id.
72. 792 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1990).
73. Id. at 948; see also Callaway v. Overholt, 796 S.W.2d 828, 833 (Tex. App.-Austin
1990, writ denied) (discussion of words denoting condition precedent).
74. 792 S.W.2d at 948; see also Mar-Len of Louisiana, Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 795
S.W.2d 880, 883, 886-87 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ denied) (dealing with words pend-
ing submitted approval as claimed condition precedent).
75. 791 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
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against misdealings.76 Thus, although various types of construction con-
tracts may be long and complex, the law continues to presume that the con-
tracting parties read and know what is in their contract. For example, the
court in Peters v. Gifford-Hill & Co., Ina 77 held the guarantor of an open
account with a concrete supplier liable for the amount of the account, even
though he claimed not to have read the guaranty agreement.
III. QUANTUM MERUrr
This article has already examined the theory and manner of pleading
quantum meruit as an alternative ground of recovery to substantial perform-
ance.78 The Texas Supreme Court in Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc.7 9 clearly and concisely set forth the following elements that a
claimant must prove to recover under quantum meruit: (1) that the party
rendered valuable services or furnished materials; (2) that the person sought
to be charged received the services or materials; (3) that the person who
received the services and materials accepted, used and enjoyed them; and (4)
that the circumstances prove that the rendering party reasonably notified the
person sought to be charged that he expected payment for the services or
materials.80
The court, in its discussion, pointed out that quantum meruit is an equita-
ble remedy, independent of contract theory.' Therefore, a party may only
recover when no express contract, covering the labor or materials furnished,
exists, because the remedy relies upon a promise implied by law to pay for
services or materials knowingly accepted when non-payment would result in
unjust enrichment to the party benefitted.82
The Texas Supreme Court issued aper curiam opinion in the construction
case of Emerson v. Tunnell.8 3 In that case a homebuilder sued homeowners
for breach of contract and quantum meruit, but failed to prove a contract.
The trial court granted a judgment for the contractor, but based the amount
of the judgment on the contractor's contract claim.8 4 In making its determi-
nation, the trial court took the erroneous position that it would be inequita-
ble to allow the contractor to recover a greater sum than the price. for which
he contracted to perform the work. 5 The supreme court disagreed, holding
that when the fact finder fails to find that a contract existed, the court need
not limit quantum meruit recovery to the alleged breach of contract dam-
ages.86 Therefore, the supreme court allowed recovery of more than the
contract amount under the quantum meruit doctrine. Practitioners must af-
76. Id. at 298.
77. 794 S.W.2d 856, 857, 861 (rex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
78. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
79. 787 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1990).
80. Id. at 944.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 793 S.W.2d 947 (rex. 1990).
84. Id. at 947.
85. Id. at 948.
86. Id.
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firmatively decide whether to plead in contract or in quantum meruit, re-
membering that sometimes a quantum meruit claim will result in more
damages than a contract claim. 87 Attorneys must also keep in mind the
general rule that if a valid express contract covering the subject matter ex-
ists, then there can be no implied contract and thus, no recovery in quantum
meruit.88 Of course, the rule is subject to exceptions, such as invalidity of
contract, abandoned contract, partial performance and substantial
performance.8 9
The theory of quantum meruit necessarily involves the submission of key
fact issues to the jury. If a claimant can show such fact issues exist, the
claimant should clearly present these issues to a jury and thus avoid a sum-
mary judgment.90 The Houston court of appeals discussed this proposition
in Ramirez Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Houston,9 in which a devel-
oper brought breach of contract and quantum meruit actions against the
City of Houston Housing Authority, seeking to recover for work performed
at two low-income housing projects. The trial court granted a summary
judgment for the housing authority, but the court of civil appeals reversed
this judgment. The appellate court found that the theory of quantum meruit
operates to award the claimant reasonable compensation for his or her ex-
erted labors. 92 Since the court believed that the amount of reasonable com-
pensation is a determination for the fact-finder, the trial court improperly
granted summary judgment because the claimant failed to meet his burden
of proof showing that no material issues existed. 93
The decision in Ramirez indicates that the claimant either established or
the opposition did not dispute the elements of quantum meruit described in
Vortt.94 Instead, the owner argued that quantum meruit should not apply
because he did not use the benefits or the fruits of the contractor's work.95
In reaching its conclusion, the court found that the owner did own the pro-
87. See. e.g., McCracken Constr. Co. v. Urrutia, 518 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1974, no writ). The court cited the following Texas rule in support of this proposition:
Where an owner wrongfully interferes with a contractor and prevents his com-
pletion of the contract, the proper measure of damages where the contractor
sues on the contract is the contract price less what would have been the cost to
the contractor of completing the work, but that this is not the sole measure of
damages since the contractor may treat the contract as rescinded and recover
under quantum meruit the full value of the work done.
Id. at 621-22 (citing Kleiner v. Eubank, 358 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
88. W & W Oil Co. v. Capps, 784 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ)
(referring to doctrine as Woodard rule, cited in Woodard v. Southwest States, Inc., 384 S.W.2d
674, 675 (Tex. 1964)); see also Noble Exploration v. Nixon DriUing Co., 794 S.W.2d 589 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1990, no writ) (preclusion of implied in fact or law contract argument due to
subject matter's coverage in expressed contract).
89. 784 S.W.2d at 537-38.
90. Ramirez Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Houston, 777 S.W.2d 167, 171 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 172.
94. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
95. 777 S.W.2d at 171-72.
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ject where the contractor performed his work and, even though the owner
had not used the product of the work in question, that fact did not establish
that the owner received no benefit from the contractor's labors. 96
IV. MECHAmC'S LIEN
A. Notices
The case of Don Hill Construction v. Dealers Electrical Supply 97 involved a
classic mechanic's lien fact situation with attendant issues. The plaintiff,
Dealers Electrical Supply, supplied an electrical subcontractor, performing
work for general contractor Don Hill Construction Company, on a project
for Brookshire Brothers, Inc., owner. The electrical supplier did not pay the
material supplier, therefore the material supplier sent its ninety-day notices
pursuant to the appropriate Property Code provisions. 93 The subcontractor,
however, did not send the required thirty-six day notice to the general con-
tractor.99 In addition to these facts, the parties stipulated that after receiv-
ing timely notice, the owner did not withhold any money from the general
contractor, but proceeded to pay out all but $1,722.69 on a $1,836,951 con-
tract. The subcontractors lien totalled the sum of $10,638.60. The owner
contended that he should not be liable for funds not withheld by him. The
owner relied on the funds trapping statute because the materialman failed to
comply with the thirty-six day notice to the general contractor.'00
The court of appeals, however, disagreed with the owner's theory. 101 In-
stead, the appellate court held that the ninety-day notice provided the owner
with an adequate and sufficient warning. 10 2 Therefore, although the mate-
rial supplier failed technically to comply with the funds trapping statute's
thirty-six day notice requirement, the owner could not escape his payment
responsibilities.10 3 The court of appeals also held the general contractor,
Don Hill Construction Co., liable under the trust fund section of the Prop-
erty Code' °4 for receiving funds and/or payments which clearly belonged to
96. Id. at 172.
97. 790 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, no writ).
98. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(b) (Vernon 1984), amended by Act of June 16,
1989, ch. 1138, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4693. The amended statute now requires the ninety-day
notices to the owner and the general contractor "not later than the 15th day of the third month
following each month in which all or part of the claimant's labor was performed or material
... was delivered." TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
99. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(b) (Vernon 1984), amended by Act of June 16,
1989, ch. 1158, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4693. Section 53.056(b), as amended, provides the
following:
If the lien claim arises from a debt incurred by subcontractor, the claimant must
give to the original contractor written notice of the unpaid balance. The claim-
ant must give the notice not later than the 15th day of the second month follow-
ing each month in which all or part of the claimant's labor was performed or
material delivered.
TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
100. See supra note 99.
101. 790 S.W.2d at 809.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 162.001-163.009 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
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the beneficiary's, Dealers Electrical Supply, trust fund.' 05 Interestingly, the
appellate court developed the case on the trial court's stipulations and find-
ings of fact.' 0 6 There is no indication whatsoever of whether the general
contractor paid the electrical subcontractor, the plaintiff's supplier, from the
funds it received from the owner. If the general contractor had not paid the
electrical subcontractor when it received notice of the materialman's lien
claim and did not subsequently pay the electrical contractor, the court's
holding is correct. The opposite result, however, seems to accrue if the elec-
trical subcontractor, not a party to the appeal, received payment. Presuma-
bly, the stipulations available to the court of appeals must have shown that
the electrical subcontractor had not received payment from Don Hill Con-
struction Co., the general contractor. It seems that the court made a more
or less implicit finding that the owner and the general contractor knew of the
material supplier's mechanic's and materialman's lien claim in ample time to
take care of it.
Another case, Ambassador Development Corp. v. Valdez, 107 involved the
liability of an owner for funds trapped under the funds trapping statute'08
and his portion of the ten percent retainage.1°9 The court in Ambassador
held that the contractor met his burden of proof of establishing entitlement
to lien under both the funds trapping and the ten percent retainage statutes,
thus allowing stacking or cumulating the liens for each."10 The Ambassador
court also dealt with whether a contractor has a burden of proof under the
retainage statute to show the amount of other lien claimants with which he
should share proportionately. The court did not have to decide this issue
since, in Ambassador, evidence did not indicate other lien claimants, there-
fore the court awarded the claimant the full ten percent retainage.11
Additionally, the Ambassador court dealt with whether a lien claim
should include pre-judgment interest." 2 The court found that the Texas
Property Code does not make any provision for the inclusion of pre-judg-
ment interest in a statutory lien.1 3 The court of appeals, in making its find-
ing regarding interest, analyzed the holdings of Palomita, Inc. v. Medley " 4
and Hayek v. Western Steel Co. "15 The court found no guidance in these
cases, stating that it was impossible to tell the holding regarding interest in
the Hayek case, and that the court in the Palomita case refused to include
pre-judgment interest without analyzing its holding." 6 The court then con-
ducted an extensive analysis of the legislative history and case law and con-
105. 790 S.W.2d at 811.
106. Id. at 806.
107. 791 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
108. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.081-.085 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1991).
109. Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.101, 53.105 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1991).
110. 791 S.W.2d at 622.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 624.
113. Id.
114. 747 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
115. 469 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971), aff'd, 478 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.
1972).
116. 791 S.W.2d at 623.
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cluded that if the legislature intended to include pre-judgment interest in the
statute, the statute would reflect this intent. Since the Texas legislature had
not inserted pre-judgment interest, the court refused to include it as part of
the lien.1 17
B. Priority of Mechanic's Lien
The case of MBank El Paso National Association v. Featherlite Corp.118
involved a priority of lien between a material supplier, with a claim against a
subcontractor validly secured by a mechanic's lien, and a bank, with a re-
corded security interest in the subcontractor's accounts receivable. In an
interesting twist of facts, the evidence showed that the material supplier re-
leased the mechanic's lien in return for a promise from the general contrac-
tor that he would issue joint checks to the subcontractor and supplier.
Because of the release, the material supplier lost as to the priority of his
lien. 1 9 Furthermore, the court opined that a mechanic's and materialman's
lien will always precede an accounts receivable security interest because the
inception of the mechanic's lien occurs when the supplier first delivers the
materials to a construction site. Since the first delivery will generally take
place before the creation of any account receivable, the lien claimant always
wins.120 Under the cases of Robbins v. Warner 121 and Preferred Heating, 1 22
the supplier conceivably could have recovered on an oral contract basis
against the general contractor.
C. Creation of Residential Mechanic's Liens
The only other cases to arise during the review period on mechanic's liens
involved the creation of mechanic's liens for the construction of residences
and for the improvement of homesteads. In First National Bank ofAmarillo
v. Jarnigan 12 3 the court considered the complexities of a documented build-
ers and mechanic's lien contract with accompanying documents in a lawsuit
by the owners of the residence against the lender. The owner claimed that
the bank could not be a holder in due course under its renewal promissory
note, executed in customary form in the usual manner of perfecting a
mechanic's and materialman's lien contract, in a three-party situation in-
volving the owners, the general contractors and a lender. Since the owners
had defenses available under the original mechanic's lien note, the trial court
directed a verdict for the debtors, stating that the bank was not a holder in
due course on its renewal note for construction of the property.124 The ap-
117. Id. at 624.
118. 792 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1990, writ denied).
119. Id. at 476.
120. Id. at 475. Interestingly, the material supplier apparently did not bring suit against
the general contractor on the general contractor's promise to cut a joint check in order to pay
the supplier directly.
121. 782 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. App.-Houston [st Dist.] 1989, no writ). See supra notes 43-
45 and accompanying text.
122. 778 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. 1989). See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
123. 794 S.W.2d 54 (rex. App.-Amarillo 1990, writ denied).
124. Id. at 56.
1991]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
pellate court reversed, holding that the trial court should not have consid-
ered the document as a single instrument. 125
V. MASTER AND SERVANT - INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
A. Employee or Independent Contractor
The question often arises on job sites and in construction businesses
whether an individual constitutes an employee or an independent contractor.
The classification of an individual often determines whether construction
company employers must withhold FICA wages, pay unemployment taxes
to the Texas Employment Agency, provide overtime wages, or contribute
towards workers' compensation coverage. In certain instances, the determi-
nation governs the various duties that the employers or contractors owe to
the individuals as either employees or independent contractors. The relevant
cases during this review period were personal injury cases arising primarily
under the workers' compensation statutes.' 26
Wasson v. Stracener 127 involved a personal injury lawsuit brought by an
employee of a construction company for injuries received when his supervi-
sor's truck was in an accident while in route between job sites. For the em-
ployee to recover, he needed to show that he was not an employee at the
time of the accident, but that the supervisor, Freeman, for whom Wasson
worked, was an employee of the construction company, Stracener. 28 The
evidence conflicted as to whether Freeman, whose vehicle was involved in
the accident, was an independent contractor or an employee of the construc-
tion company. 129 Since the appeal arose from a summary judgment, the
court did not decide the issue. It itemized in detail, however, the factors
considered in determining whether an individual is a worker or an employee.
As set forth by the court, the factors focus on the worker's relative indepen-
dence in performing his job; obligation to furnish necessary tools, supplies
and materials to complete the task; ability to control the project's progress,
except with regards to final results; employment duration; and compensa-
tion, whether by time or by the job. 130
The Texas Supreme Court, in a case involving an injured jockey, stated
that the test to determine whether a worker is an employee or independent
contractor is whether the employer maintains control over the progress, de-
tails, and methods of operations of the employees' work. '31 In its holding,
the supreme court cited certain examples of the type of control normally
exercised by an employer. 132 Obviously, the court could use the same or
125. Id. at 59. The second case to arise in the review period on this subject was First
Victoria Nat. Bank v. Briones, 788 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
126. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 8308-1.01-8309 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
127. 786 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
128. Id. at 419.
129. Id. at 420-21.
130. Id. at 420.
131. Thompson v. Travelers Indem. Co. of R.I., 789 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1990).
132. The Texas Supreme Court included the following as determinative factors: "when
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similar tests in issues involving payment of FICA or other withholding
taxes, unemployment taxes, workers' compensation, overtime pay, or other
similar questions.
B. Duty Owed to Independent Contractor
With regard to tort law, a contractor or owner owes a legal duty of care of
safety if the contractor or owner maintains any control at all over the in-
dependent contractor's employees. In Lawson-Avila Construction Inc. v.
Stoutamire133 a subcontractor's employee and the estate of a deceased em-
ployee brought suit against the general contractor on a school project for
injuries incurred when the employees fell from a joist lifted by the subcon-
tractor. The court considered in detail the responsibilities of the general
contractor, including the use of proper construction methods, the responsi-
bility for the actions and omissions of subcontractors, the maintenance of
discipline, ensuring compliance of the project with laws, the employment of
competent supervision, the maintenance of safety programs, and the designa-
tion of a safety director for the job.134 The court found sufficient evidence to
hold that the general contractor had sufficient control over the subcontrac-
tors to justify the imposition of legal duty of care.135
VI. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND STATUTE OF REPOSE
The Dallas court of appeals dealt with the ten year statute of repose136 in
Lambert v. Wansbrough,137 a case in which a homeowner sued a roofing
contractor for defective installation approximately six years after the defects
in performance first manifested themselves. The court found that the limita-
tions period begins to run not later than the time when the injured party first
sustains damage or injury, and, thus, the four year statute barred the
and where to begin and stop work, the regularity of hours, the amount of time spent on partic-
ular aspects of the work, the tools and appliances used to perform the work and the physical
method or manner of accomplishing the end result." Id. at 279; see also Ross v. Texas One
Partnership, 796 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), writ denied per curliam, No. D-
0425, (rex. Jan. 23, 1991) (WESTLAW State library, TX-CS file)) (holding that primary test is
which party to relationship possesses "the right of control over the details of the work").
133. 791 S.W.2d 584 (rex. App.---San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
134. Id. at 589.
135. Id. at 591. The Texas Supreme Court, in Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415
(Tex. 1985), stated the legal duty of care as follows:
An owner or occupier of land has a duty to use reasonable care to keep the
premises under his control in a safe condition .... A general contractor on a
construction site, who is in control of the premises, is charged with the same
duty as owner or occupier .... This duty to keep the premises in a safe condi-
tion may subject the general contractor to direct liability for negligence in two
situations: (1) those arising from a premises defect, (2) those arising from an
activity or instrumentality.
Id. at 417; Lawson-Avila Constr. Inc. v. Stoutamire, 791 S.W.2d at 588 (quoting Redinger, 689
S.W.2d at 417); see also Ross, 796 S.W.2d at 216; City of Houston v. Goings, 795 S.W.2d 829,
834 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (one who retains control over any
part of work, may incur liability for failure to use reasonable care).
136. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.009 (Vernon 1986).
137. 783 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
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claim. 138 The owner then attempted to bring the claim under the ten year
statute of repose. The court held that the legislature intended this statute to
bar suits ten years after the completion of improvements, even with respect
to losses manifesting themselves after ten years. 139 In other words, the court
held that under the law, prior to the enactment of the statute of repose, the
two and four year statutes did not commence to run until the cause of action
accrued (i.e., the damage manifested itself) and the statute of repose cut off
such claims after ten years. 14 The court held that the statute of repose does
not extend or affect the period prescribed for bringing an action under any
law of the state, and that the two and ten year statutes barred the six year
old claim as if the legislature never enacted the ten year statute. 141
In Rodarte v. Carrier Corp. 142 the court discussed the applicability and the
constitutionality of the statute of repose. In that case the estate of an indi-
vidual electrocuted while attempting to repair a heater/air conditioner unit
installed in 1965 brought a wrongful death claim approximately seventeen
years after installation. The court classified the heating and air conditioning
unit as an improvement to the property, thus falling under the statute of
repose. 143 Since the estate brought the suit more than ten years after the
accident, the statute of repose absolutely barred the claim. 144 With regard to
a claim that the statute of repose violated the constitutional rights of due
process, equal protection and open access, the court considered numerous
cases and found no violation of constitutional rights. 145
El Paso Associates Ltd. v. JR. Thurman & Co. 146 involved an action by a
purchaser of certain real property against a seller for defects in the building
project built on an old landfill. Although the purchase occurred on July 30,
1981, evidence indicated discovery of the defect occurred in 1981. There
was an inspection report in 1984 and 1985. Although not stated, the claim-
ant apparently brought the lawsuit some years later and the court granted
defendant's summary judgment based on its defense of limitations. ' 47 The
court set out the following laundry list of the basic limitations applicable to
various causes of action: (1) two years from the perpetration of fraud or, if
concealed, from the time of discovery; (2) two years from breach or discov-
ery of breach of a fiduciary duty; (3) two years from actions or discoveries of
actions under the deceptive trade practice acts; (4) four years from breach of
contract or from the time when the injured party obtained knowledge of the
breach; and (5) four years from actions or discovery of actions of breach of
express or implied warranty.148 The court of appeals went on to find suffi-
138. Id. at 6.
139. Id. at 7.
140. Id.
141. 783 S.W.2d at 7.
142. 786 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ dism'd by agr.).
143. Id. at 95-96.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 96.
146. 786 S.W.2d 17 (rex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ).
147. Id. at 18.
148. Id. at 20-21; see also Allen v. Roddis Lumber & Veneer Co., 796 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex
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cient evidence regarding a conflict in the facts of discovery with regards to
the use of reasonable diligence so as to remand the case for trial. 149
Lastly, in the case of Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. La Villa In-
dependent School District 150 the court of appeals, in a lawsuit on a payment
and performance bond under the McGregor Act, 151 considered whether the
limitations period for suit on the bond fell one year after the contract's final
date of completion, as provided in the McGregor Act,152 or two years from
the contract's final date of payment, as provided in the general contractor's
bond. 153 The court, however, did not have to decide whether the non-statu-
tory bond actually extended the limitations period of the McGregor Act be-
cause, even under the extended period, the lawsuit would have been
barred.15 4
VII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Beaumont court of appeals, in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Youngtown,
Inc.,155 restated the long-established Texas law that pleadings sounding in
contract will not support a punitive damage recovery claim.' 56 This case,
which involved a suit by a developer as plaintiff against a homebuilder and
an owner of a home for violation of deed restrictions, resulted in a jury ver-
dict of $7,200 for contractual damages and $25,000 in punitive damages.
The damages included the homebuilder's failure to comply with the square
footage foundation and brick veneer requirements of the subdivision build-
ing restrictions. Since the plaintiff's pleadings only contained the contract
action, the court reversed and rendered the case, repeating the damage rule
that requires an independent tort finding to recover damages for breach of
contract. 15
7
HOW Insurance Co. v. Patriot Financial Services of Texas, Inc. 158 involved
a deceptive trade practices lawsuit by an owner of a condominium who suc-
cessfully recovered punitive damages against the builders and owners of the
condominium complex and against their insurance company. The insurance
company provided the homeowner's warranty and insurance. The plaintiff
had purchased a luxury condominium and experienced numerous problems
with the finish-out, including water intrusion resulting from faulty construc-
tion that led to wood rot. When the original builders and developers would
not remedy the problem, the insurance company assured the homeowner
they would solve the situation but, after becoming aware that the difficulties
App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (defining rule of discovery as "when the plaintiff discov-
ers the injury and its cause.") (emphasis added).
149. 786 S.W.2d at 21.
150. 779 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
151. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
152. Id. at 5160(G).
153. 779 S.W.2d at 105.
154. Id.
155. 786 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, no writ).
156. Id. at 12.
157. Id.
158. 786 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
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extended throughout the entire construction project, failed to do so. The
court examined all the evidence, including the jury's unconscionability find-
ing of egregious conduct on the part of the insurance company in not reme-
dying the homeowner's problems. 159 The court then found that the plaintiff
could recover damages for mental anguish, even in the absence of other eco-
nomic or physical harm. 160 The court stated that in order to establish such
mental anguish the plaintiff must show more than mere worry, anxiety, em-
barrassment or anger, and should include mental sensations of painful emo-
tions, such as grief, severe disappointment, wounded pride, shame, despair
or public humiliation. 161 The court further upheld the award of exemplary
damages in this case because the builders and developers, while representing
the condominiums to be meticulously constructed, had, as found by the jury,
accepted disproportionately low bids. Furthermore, a construction supervi-
sor testified that contractors who give such disproportionately low bids may
not perform quality work. 162 Other evidence showed that the builder had
changed design specifications in order to make the project more economical.
Two other rather unusual cases based on trover and conversion allowed
punitive damages in the context of construction contracts for material sup-
ply. In Transfer Products, Inc. v. TexPar Energy, Inc. 163 the plaintiff,
TexPar Energy, contracted to buy asphalt from the seller, Transfer Prod-
ucts. Prior to delivery, the seller arbitrarily declared a storage charge on the
goods and, before purchaser had a chance to remove the goods, actually
started reselling the asphalt to third parties. The court found that the at-
tempt to collect unreasonable storage charges and the actual and intentional
selling of purchaser's goods without just cause or excuse under the guise of
the Uniform Commercial Code remedy constituted implied or legal mal-
ice. 16 The court further found that it was unnecessary to find malice if
hatred, dislike, spite or resentment existed since the court could infer malice
from unlawful actions without reasonable grounds.165 The court held that
such action was so egregious that it amounted to trover and conversion
under common law, and that exemplary damages were proper. 166
In another case on trover and conversion, Vickery v. Texas Carpet Co.,167
the facts more clearly resembled a typical construction case. In this case,
defendant Vickery contracted with Texas Carpet Co. to furnish and install
carpet for a bank project. After Texas Carpet commenced construction,
Vickery did not allow it to complete installation. Vickery sold the building
and Texas Carpet never received payment for the padding and carpet that it
installed. The plaintiff brought a case for breach of contract and conver-
159. Id. at 539-42.
160. Id. at 543.
161. Id. at 542.
162. 786 S.W.2d at 545.
163. 788 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
164. Id. at 715-16.
165. Id. at 715.
166. Id. at 717.
167. 792 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
[Vol. 45
CONSTRUCTION LAW
sion.168 The court awarded damages to the plaintiff for breach of contract
and for conversion because the owner sold the building without allowing the
carpet company to either recover their carpet or receive payment for it. 169
The court found this to be a showing either of willful and knowing conver-
sion or of reckless disregard of the rights of others and sufficient to sustain
an assessment of exemplary damages. 170
VIII. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
In Commercial Union Insurance v. La Villa School District171 an
owner/school district brought suit against a general contractor (Tocon) for,
among other things, the payment of one hundred dollars per day in liqui-
dated damages for the general contractor's failure to complete the project on
the date set forth in the contract. The general contractor objected, stating
that liquidated damage provision constituted a penalty provision and should
not be allowed. The appellate court set out the usual rule for liquidated
damages, stating that the court will enforce such a provision if the harm
caused by the breach is difficult to estimate and the amount of liquidated
damages is reasonable.' 7 2 The court then astutely pointed out that the rule
puts the burden on the party asserting that a liquidated damages clause con-
stitutes a penalty to prove the amount of the other party's actual damages, if
any, to show that the liquidated damages are not an approximation of the
stipulated sum. 17 3 The evidence in this case, as in most cases, did not indi-
cate the actual damages. Since the general contractor did not carry its bur-
den of proof, the appellate court had no choice but to presume that the trial
court found the damages caused by the general contractor's breach were
either impossible or difficult to estimate, and that the liquidated damages
constituted just compensation.' 7 4 Therefore, the general contractor failed to
prove that liquidated damages were a penalty by failing to prove the adver-
sary's actual damages.
IX. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
The Dallas court of appeals, in F & P Builders v. Lowe's of Texas, Inc, 17
dealt with a creative argument of a buyer of construction materials who did
not desire to pay for the materials. The buyer argued that the seller, who
168. Interestingly, instead of the case being one of a filed mechanic's and materialman's
lien with evidence presented on substantial performance or for materials delivered, the case
turned on conversion.
169. 792 S.W.2d at 763.
170. Id. at 763.
171. 779 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ). See supra notes 150-54
and accompanying text.
172. Id. at 106.
173. Id. at 106-07; see also Lacy v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 794 S.W.2d 781, 792 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990) (enforcing forfeiture of $200,000 in earnest money on earnest money real estate
contract as liquidated damages based on parties' agreement), writ denied per curiam, 803
S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1991).
174. 779 S.W.2d at 107.
175. 786 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
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had delivered the materials, had a common law duty to mitigate damages by
accepting a return of the materials. This argument ignores the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code provision that states that a seller may recover the
price of goods accepted by the buyer.1 76 The court had no difficulty in find-
ing that the statutory provision supplants the common law duty for a seller
to mitigate damages by accepting return of the goods. 177
X. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
Unhappy homeowners typically bring the cases that arise in a construc-
tion context against a contractor who contracted to build their house or to
perform home improvements to their residence or against a lender who fi-
nances the project under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act."78 Homeowners who enter into agreements with contrac-
tors for construction of home improvements are consumers. 179 Generally,
the lender financing the construction is not liable for deceptive trade prac-
tices actions for bad construction unless the lender committed its own decep-
tive trade practices act violation or was vicariously liable. The case of Home
Savings Association Service Corp. v. Martinez discusses this point.I SO In that
case, homeowners contracted with the contractor, Gershenson, to do reno-
vation work on their residence. Home Savings Association financed the pro-
ject. Home Savings delivered two checks, apparently in the full amount, to
pay for the renovation. Both checks were endorsed on or about the date of
delivery and sent to the contractor. In the subsequent suit for deceptive
trade practices, the homeowner sued the general contractor and the lender.
The general contractor did not appeal.191 The court of appeals held that the
lender incurred no liability under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act in this
case because of its innocent involvement in the business transaction.' 8 2 The
homeowners attempted to argue that the lender and the contractor were in-
extricably intertwined, because they had relied on statements made by the
closing agent for the lender that the contractor was reputable. Neither the
trial court nor the court of appeals could find any actionable misrepresenta-
tion by the lender in this case.' 83
In J.B. Custom Design and Building v. Clawson 18 4 the egregious conduct
of a construction contractor resulted in a jury's award of damages that was
subsequently increased by the trial court. In that case, the homeown-
ers/consumers hired a contractor, Clawson, to design and install foundation
repairs to prevent their house from subsiding. Testimony showed that the
176. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.709(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
177. 786 S.W.2d at 503.
178. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987 & Supp.
1991).
179. See Briercroft Service Corp. v. De Los Santos, 776 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1988, writ denied).
180. 788 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ requested).
181. Id. at 53.
182. Id. at 54.
183. Id. at 58.
184. 794 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
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attempted leveling left wrinkles in the linoleum, damaged molding around
doors, damaged patio doors and sewer lines, and caused structural damage
creating an unlevel situation. The homeowners recovered $8,000 in actual
damages, which the trial court increased by $6,000. In addition, the hus-
band recovered $5,000 and the wife recovered $3,000 in mental anguish
damages. In response to an attack on the mental damage award based on a
lack of showing of high degree of mental pain and stress, the court found
that the homeowners' testimony showed that they had experienced a tremen-
dous amount of embarrassment and distress. This finding raised a sufficient
factual issue to go to the jury, which the court found best suited to determine
whether the homeowners' suffered mere worry, not entitling them to dam-
ages for mental anguish, or relatively high degree of pain and suffering com-
pensable in mental anguish damages." 5 The court of appeals upheld the
jury's verdict for mental anguish, although it reduced the trial court's discre-
tionary award and reinstated the jury's original award for actual damages.'16
XI. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SET ASIDES
A new and developing area of construction jurisprudence in the United
States in the last several years includes the issue of set aside programs,
whereby a government agency, acting as owner, designates a certain percent-
age of work done on the governmental projects to be performed only by
qualified groups, such as minority business enterprises, women business en-
terprises or some other qualified group, such as residents of a particular city
or state. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 187 represents one of the most
significant cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in the con-
struction area in the last several years. In that case, the Court struck down a
City of Richmond ordinance requiring that qualified minority business en-
terprises perform thirty percent of the dollar amount of general contractors'
contracts on city work.
The issue of minority set asides and other set asides arose in two very
unusual cases in Texas in 1989 and 1990. The first case, Rodriguez v. Univer-
sal Fastenings Corp. ,188 was a death case brought by the surviving spouse
and children of a construction worker killed on a construction project when
he fell from a concrete slab. The plaintiffs sued all of the subcontractors on
the project at the time of the accident, including a minority business enter-
prise, Pro-Kote. Apparently the plaintiff elicited testimony, not allowed in
the trial of the case, with the intent of showing that Pro-Kote was a minority
contractor that received the contract because of a minority set aside. The
plaintiff also alleged that the minority business enterprise was a sham. The
trial court did not allow this evidence and defendants tried to raise the mat-
185. Id. at 43; see St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 653-54 (Tex. 1987)
(Texas Supreme Court test for mental anguish damages).
186. 794 S.W.2d at 44.
187. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
188. 777 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
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ter on appeal.18 9 The appellate court affirmed the actions of the trial court
in disallowing the evidence, agreeing with the trial court that the evidence
would be irrelevant and immaterial and tend to confuse and potentially prej-
udice the jury. 190
The only other case involving'set asides was the curious Baytown Con-
struction Co. v. City of Port Arthur decision. 191 That case involved an ordi-
nance of the City of Port Arthur, Texas called the "Residence Jobs Policy
Ordinance," which required construction contractors dealing with the City
of Port Arthur to employ Port Arthur residents to perform sixty percent of
the hours worked in each craft required to perform the contracted job. Bay-
town Construction Company was awarded a contract to construct a landfill
for the City of Port Arthur and was later sanctioned in the amount of a one
percent penalty, $4,878.59, and issued a three year ban on bidding for future
construction projects for the city for its failure to comply with the ordinance.
The court granted partial summary judgment to the City of Port Arthur in
its action for a declaratory judgment.192 The Beaumont court of appeals
held that the ordinance would probably be constitutional, 193 but the fact that
the city changed the definition of residents and the application of the ordi-
nance's procedures after Baytown received its contract and began work vio-
lated the Texas and United States Constitutions. The court found a
constitutional violation because Baytown did not receive notice before a
summary forfeiture and a hearing prior to any finding on a violation of the
ordinance. 194 Thus, the court found Baytown's rights under its original con-
tract to be property rights protected by the due process and due course of
law requirements of the Texas and United States Constitutions.195 As vari-
ous governmental agencies of the State of Texas, federal government, and
private owners enact different set aside programs, more litigation will arise
regarding minority, women and other set aside programs.
XII. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
A. Attorney & Client-Attorney Conflict
Insurance Co. of North America v. Westergren 196 provides an example of
what can happen when an attorney represents a contractor and the contrac-
tor's payment and performance surety when a case arises on a payment or
performance bond. There is always a potential, inherent conflict if the
surety and contractor ever have disputes with each other. In this case, the
same attorney represented a general contractor and its surety, INA, against
claims by subcontractors against the general contractor on a school project
in Harlingen. The attorney signed pleadings on behalf of the surety and the
189. Id. at 517.
190. Id. at 517-18.
191. 792 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, no writ).
192. Id. at 556.
193. Id. at 563.
194. Id. at 559.
195. 792 S.W.2d at 559.
196. 794 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990) (overruling mandamus motion).
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contractor during the pendency of these claims, all of which were consoli-
dated into one lawsuit and settled. After these claims were settled, another
materialman filed a lawsuit against the general contractor and surety. The
same attorney once again entered his appearance, representing both the gen-
eral contractor and the surety. Soon thereafter, the surety filed a lawsuit
against the general contractor to recover adjusted premiums on a liability
policy, and the general contractor counterclaimed against the surety com-
pany for a declaratory judgment and on a bad faith claim. The attorney,
who had previously represented the surety and the general contractor, with-
drew in the remaining bond claim action and attempted to represent the
general contractor against the surety company. The surety subsequently
filed a motion to disqualify the attorney because of his previous representa-
tion of the bond company. The trial court denied the motion and the surety
brought a mandamus action to have him removed. 197 The attorney argued
on appeal that his representation of the surety was a mere accommodation
orproforma relationship. 198 The appellate court found nothing in the disci-
plinary rules that permits a pro forma representation of a client and in-
structed the trial judge to disqualify the attorney from representation of the
general contractor client against the surety.1 99
B. Arbitration
The court of appeals in USX Corp. v. West 200 dealt with a party greatly
frustrated with arbitration procedures. In this case, Energy Buyers Service
Corporation, a seller of natural gas, sued USX Corporation, a purchaser of
natural gas, for breach of contract. Judge David West, the respondent in
this mandamus action, heard this breach of contract action in Harris
County, Texas. In the case in chief, the plaintiff sought $158,000 for con-
tractual damages and $75,000,000 for lost profits and punitive damages. The
contract in question contained a provision that any controversy arising
under the agreement would be determined by arbitration in Columbus,
Ohio, under the rules of the American Arbitration Association..
The parties appealed this case to the appellate court twice. In the first
appeal, 201 the appellate court granted mandamus relief, directing the trial
court to grant a plea in abatement and refer the case to arbitration.20 2 On
December 14, 1989, the same appellate court once again heard disputes re-
garding the arbitration. In this appeal, USX Corporation complained that
the other party to the action did not properly submit all of its claims tothe
arbitrator, including a claim for actual damages and punitive damages. Ap-
parently, Energy Buyers, the other party to the arbitration, simply submitted
a claim to the American Arbitration Association alleging breach of contract
resulting in damages and including a counterclaim for damages arising from
197. Id. at 814.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 815.
200. 781 S.W.2d 453 (rex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1989, no writ).
201. 759 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1988).
202. Id. at 768.
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the alleged breach. Energy Buyers further alleged that the arbitrator's duties
did not include a determination on the damage issue.
The court of appeals' opinion is interesting in that it does not grant USX
Corporation's petition to mandamus the judge to direct that all of the issues
be submitted to arbitration. It does hold, however, that Texas courts have
the power to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act2o3 and
that a proper controversy subject to arbitration includes all claims for any
type of damages that the parties have against each other, including breach of
contract, actual damages and punitive damages.204 Furthermore, the court
found that all issues in the controversy were before the arbitrator and, there-
fore, the enforcement of any pleading requirement, such as that sought by
USX Corporation, is a procedural matter for determination by the arbitra-
tor.205 Therefore, the court announced that since the arbitrator receives the
entire case and becomes the judge for legal matters and fact finding on all
issues that come before him, the courts will stay out of the dispute.206
C. Garnishment
In Industrial Indemnity v. Texas American Bank--Riverside20 7 the court
dealt with an unfortunate, but common, scenario in the construction indus-
try: a dispute involving insolvent subcontractors and contractors leaving lit-
igation between the creditor of a subcontractor and a surety of a general
contractor. The subcontractor, Shaw, performed work on a project for a
general contractor, Hambrick-Craig, that was bonded by Industrial Indem-
nity, the surety company. The subcontractor was not paid on the job and
obtained a judgment against Hambrick-Craig and the surety for $17,120.12
plus interest. The surety appealed the judgment. In the meantime, a credi-
tor of the subcontractor, Texas American Bank, obtained a judgment against
the subcontractor, Shaw, and attempted to garnish the judgment amount
that Industrial Indemnity Company owed Shaw. After the bank filed the
writ of garnishment and the surety answered, but before trial of the matter,
the surety settled its claim with Shaw and paid Shaw an agreed amount in
compromise and settlement of the claim. In exchange, Shaw released the
surety company.
In the garnishment proceeding, the trial court found that the surety vio-
lated the command of the garnishment and rendered a $21,003.98 judgment
against the surety from which the surety appealed. The surety took the posi-
tion that the writ of garnishment did not reach its obligation to Shaw be-
cause the obligation was contingent and uncertain, on appeal, and without a
203. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
204. 781 S.W.2d at 455.
205. Id. at 456.
206. It is instructive to note the long time period involved and the fact that two appealsinvolving this arbitration have now been before the court of appeals, with no resolution, at
least as of December, 1989. The goals of arbitration, economy and efficiency in the resolution
of disputes, apparently have not been met in this case.
207. 784 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
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final judgment.208 The court of appeals extensively reviewed the issue of
whether Shaw's judgment against the surety was liquidated or uniqui-
dated.20 9 The court also analyzed the wording of the writ of garnishment in
connection with the state's procedural rules210 and held that, in light of the
words of the rule of civil procedure and writ of garnishment, the surety vio-
lated the order whether the judgment in favor of Shaw on appeal was liqui-
dated or unliquidated. 211 Therefore, the appellate court affirmed a trial
court judgment in favor of the creditor against the surety,212 thus requiring
the surety to pay twice.
D. Usury
It seems that some of the most onerous usury cases, holding sellers of
goods or services liable for the penalties for usury, arise in disputes between
suppliers in the construction industry and their vendees. 213 The review pe-
riod did not go by without a typical suit arising on this subject. The facts in
White v. Groco Corp.214 are not unusual. White, an oil field service contrac-
tor, performed certain services for Groco Corporation (Groco), operator of
an oil and gas lease. Groco's invoice to its customer contained a clause
which allowed Groco to add one and one half percent per month to any
remaining balance overdue by thirty days or more. Since this amount con-
stituted more than twice the sum allowed by statute on open accounts with-
out an agreement as to interest, the customer made a counterclaim of usury
when sued for the unpaid balance due.215 The trial court found usury, ren-
dered a judgement that the contractor take nothing on its $10,715.44 claim
for services rendered, and allowed the customer to recover a judgment on its
$17,500.65 counterclaim for usury, plus attorney's fee.21 6 The court of civil
appeals reversed and rendered because of the fact that although the invoice
language provided for usurious interest, neither the contractor nor his attor-
ney ever made any demand for the payment of usurious interest.217 In fact,
the appellate court found that in the contractor's demand letter, its attorney
asked for the proper statutory amount of interest at the rate of six percent
208. Id. at 119.
209. Id. at 119-21.
210. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 661 commands the garnishee "NOT to pay to defend-
ant any debt or to deliver to him any effects pending further order of this court." TEx. R. Civ.
P. 661 (emphasis in original).
211. 784 S.W.2d at 122.
212. Id.
213. See, eg., Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1979)(de-
claring supplier's term of sale, which provided for 12% interest on unpaid accounts, usurious
because statute sets cap of 10%).
214. 783 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ denied).
215. If the parties have not agreed to an interest rate, the courts read the statutory rate of
six percent per annum into the agreement 30 days after the sum lapses. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987). "A party charging more than six percent under such
circumstances is subject to the statutory penalties provided in TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-1.06 (Vernon 1987)." Risica & Sons, Inc. v. Tubelite, 794 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
216. 783 S.W.2d at 25.
217. Id. at 26.
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per annum commencing on the thirtieth day from and after the time when
the sums become due and payable.218
E. Insurance
The case of T. C. Bateson Construction Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casu-
alty Co.219 stands for the rule of exclusion under comprehensive general lia-
bility insurance policies customarily held by general contractors on projects.
This rule allows coverage for injury or property damage to third parties or
property of others that the insured's product may have damaged, but does
not permit coverage for replacement and repair of the insured's property.
This rule of exclusion is known as the business risk exclusion and the court
of appeals in this case observed that parties widely recognize such business
risk exclusions.220
In Bateson the general contractor installed certain marble sheets on the
outside of a library for the University of Texas. When cracks appeared in
the marble sheets, the University requested Bateson to make the repairs,
which he refused to do. The University retained another contractor who
made the repairs, and the University subsequently filed suit against Bateson
for the cost of repairs. Bateson then made demand upon its insurance com-
prehensive liability carrier, Lumbermens, which denied coverage under the
business risk rule. The trial court rendered a summary judgment in favor of
the insurance company.22' The court of appeals, after an extensive analysis,
held the exclusions valid and affirmed the summary judgment against the
general contractor.222
XIII. CONCLUSION
Since the Texas Legislature remained dormant during this review period,
the courts mainly attempted to reaffirm and clarify prior legislative acts and
current common law principles. Under basic contract law concepts, the
courts dealt with fact-specific cases in order to analyze the intent of parties
with regards to expressed negligence, home improvements and oral modifi-
cations. Also, the courts clarified the distinction between pleading in quan-
tum meruit and substantial performance. Finally, the courts reaffirmed
certain basic rules with particular significance to the construction industry,
such as mechanic's liens, the master-servant relationship, and the various
damage options available in the construction industry.
218. Id; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987).
219. 784 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
220. Id. at 695.
221. Id. at 694.
222. Id. at 700.
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